ROMULUS ClickFix platform delivers CNCMachineRMS RAT and LegionLoader via DLL sideloading
Severity: high · Patch status: no-fix-needed · Since 2026-09-28
Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (research published 2026-11-18) assesses with high confidence that the RAT delivered by the ROMULUS ClickFix platform is CNCMachineRMS, a family LevelBlue documented in August 2026 at the end of a separate BabaDeda chain. Victims are lured by fake verification or installer pages that get them to run a PowerShell command. The command fetches an MSI named IconEdit2Turb.msi, which poses as Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool and is run silently through msiexec. The MSI launches the signed Stardock host DeElevate64.exe, whose companion DLL has been modified to load a malicious I++u.dll; that loader decrypts about 341 KB of shellcode, which runs the RAT from a proprietary Storage container. The RAT provides remote desktop, screen streaming, microphone and camera capture, file management, reconnaissance and on-demand payload execution. It finds its C2 through DNS-over-HTTPS and persists through a Run key and a scheduled task, both named Stardock DeElevation Tool. Blackpoint also reports ROMULUS delivering LegionLoader through a separate chain, and it observed no post-exploitation activity from the RAT. Huntress had documented the same final implant in September 2026 through ChatGPT Custom GPT and Google Sites lures, and Forescout named the ROMULUS platform on 2026-10-15. No software fix applies; the controls are blocking web-initiated ClickFix execution, controlling msiexec and PowerShell launched from web content, detecting DLL sideloading and non-browser DoH, and hunting the persistence. The 70,000-site figure that earlier appeared in this record is Stormshield's count of compromised websites across EtherHiding-type campaigns, not ROMULUS data, and was removed. Other ClickFix campaigns reported the same week are related by technique only.
What to do
- Block ClickFix-style execution: warn users against pasting commands into Run, PowerShell or Terminal from web pages, and block where endpoint policy allows
- Restrict msiexec and PowerShell launched from browser-initiated content, and alert on a PowerShell download followed by a silent msiexec install of an MSI whose Mark of the Web was removed
- Alert on DeElevate64.exe or any signed host loading DeElevator64.dll or I++u.dll from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\, and compare DLL hashes with the legitimate Stardock install
- Block the Blackpoint IOCs: IconEdit2Turb.msi (SHA-256 91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2), I++u.dll (SHA-256 3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621), the domains cloubflare[.]top and cloubflare[.]net, and the nine ROMULUS C2 addresses in Blackpoint's network table
- Hunt persistence: a Run value and a scheduled task both named Stardock DeElevation Tool, and CNCMachineRMS\tasks directories containing task_payload.bin
- Flag non-browser processes resolving DNS over HTTPS through public resolvers, which is how the RAT locates its C2 gate
- Deploy EDR detections for RAT behaviour: screen capture and microphone or camera access from unexpected processes
Sources
All live incidents on Threat Watch