OVHcloud CLI: GitHub release binaries swapped with GlassWorm credential stealer (no CVE)
Severity: critical · Patch status: no-fix-needed · Since 2026-10-19
On 2026-10-19 (12:47–14:21 UTC), an attacker using contributor account HassenBF replaced release binaries on ovh/ovhcloud-cli v0.11.0–v0.15.0 with a locally built credential stealer (GlassWorm loader), also replacing checksums.txt; no tags, CI, or source were touched. Initial access traced to a malicious VS Code extension (color-picker-universal) installed on a developer's personal MacBook in Oct 2025, with stolen keys used for uploads. The stealer targets AI-agent credential stores, cloud CLIs, Docker/Kubernetes configs, SSH keys, and more, staging in /tmp/envchecker-. A customer's pinned-SHA256 CI check detected it within 94 minutes. OVHcloud deleted the assets and shipped clean, attested v0.16.0 (advisory GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw). Homebrew, go install, and source builds were not exposed.
What to do
- If you downloaded or ran any ovhcloud binary from GitHub releases between 12:47–14:21 UTC on 2026-10-19, treat the host as fully compromised and assume exfiltration succeeded
- Rotate every secret the machine could read (cloud CLIs, AI-agent credentials, Docker/K8s configs, SSH keys, NPM, .netrc, .gitconfig) from a different machine
- Check for /tmp/envchecker-* staging directories on potentially affected hosts
- Reinstall from the clean v0.16.0 and verify with gh release verify-asset v0.16.0 ovhcloud-cli_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
- Note that updating or reinstalling the CLI alone revokes nothing; secret rotation is required
Fixed versions
Sources
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