OPTIMJACK: attacker-written Optimizely project JS served wallet clipper and card skimmer to 178 orgs
Severity: high · Patch status: patched · Since 2026-11-16
On 2026-11-16 an attacker wrote malicious code into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web customer projects, so the per-project snippets served from cdn.optimizely.com (and from some customers' own domains) carried a loader for 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Report URI's Scott Helme counted 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations out of 1,611 checked, named sites including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Ledger, and says the real number is probably higher. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC. The payload swaps copied or displayed wallet addresses on eight chain families, and from 13:43 UTC it also skims Luhn-valid card details typed into a site's own fields (hosted payment iframes were out of reach). After a swap it sends the page URL, non-HttpOnly cookies and a screenshot to the attacker, and on older iPhones and iPads it loads Coruna and DarkSword exploit-kit loaders from .icu domains. Attacker wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC; how many cards or cookies were taken is unknown. Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to add the code; neither its statement nor its 2026-11-17 status notice explains how a signup gave write access to other customers' projects. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code and notified affected customers. Most snippets were clean by 21:10 UTC on 2026-11-16. Hudson Rock traced the same loader and mobile-router infrastructure to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts from 2026-11-13, so a clean Optimizely snippet does not rule out exposure. Block the indicators, inspect every third-party snippet you serve, and treat any card or wallet address entered or copied on an affected page that day as compromised.
What to do
- Block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the listed .icu domains (with subdomains) at proxy and DNS, and search logs back to 2026-11-13
- Fetch every Optimizely snippet you serve (cdn.optimizely.com or your own domain) and search the Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code for 1688360, webshell, atob( loaders and track.js; check Last-Modified
- Review who and what can write to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations), remove anything you do not recognise and rotate credentials
- If you load Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or Minute Media (minute-ly) scripts, inspect them for the same loader
- Check CSP reports and browser telemetry for requests to 1688360[.]cc to find pages where the loader ran
- Treat any card entered into your own form fields, or any wallet address copied or entered on an affected page on 2026-11-16, as compromised; rotate session tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies
- Restrict script-src and connect-src in CSP and drop 'unsafe-eval' where you can: Report URI found that a restrictive script-src blocked the payload
- Visitors: update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 / 26.3 or later
Sources
All live incidents on Threat Watch