MCP Python SDK: OAuth client sends credentials to a server-chosen auth server (CVE-2026-115563)
Severity: high · Patch status: patched · Since 2026-11-19 · CVE-2026-115563
The MCP Python SDK's OAuth client can send a client secret, authorization code, PKCE codeverifier or signed client assertion to a token endpoint that an untrusted MCP server chooses. In 1.9.1 to 1.29.1 and 2.0.0 to 2.1.1 the client did not check the issuer of authorization server metadata, and stored or pre-provisioned client credentials were not bound to the server they belong to. In 2.x the gap appears only on fallback discovery (no protected resource metadata, or a 403 insufficientscope response). Affected are HTTP clients using OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider or the deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider. Fixed in 1.30.0 and 2.2.0. Upgrading alone does not close the hole for the two unattended providers: they must be given issuer= naming the authorization server their credentials belong to, and stored client registrations must be cleared once so they re-register bound to that issuer. Credentials that reached an untrusted server before the fix should be rotated and their tokens revoked.
What to do
- Upgrade mcp to 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x) or later
- Pass issuer= to ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider and PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider naming the authorization server their credentials belong to
- Clear stored OAuth client registrations so the client re-registers with issuer binding (or set issuer on pre-registered records)
- Rotate client secrets and revoke tokens at the authorization server for any client that may have connected to an untrusted MCP server
- Until patched, connect OAuth-enabled MCP clients only to fully trusted MCP servers; replace deprecated RFC7523OAuthClientProvider
Fixed versions
Sources
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