install-artifact-from-github: unverified native downloads allow RCE via mirror or redirect (CVE-2026-73864)
Severity: high · Patch status: partial · Since 2026-07-08 · CVE-2026-73864
install-artifact-from-github (npm, <= 1.6.0) downloads prebuilt native addons (.node) and writes them to the artifact path with no checksum, signature or SRI check; the consuming package then require()s them, so anyone who can influence the download runs code on the installing machine. The download host comes from environment variables such as RE2DOWNLOADMIRROR with no pinning, http:// URLs are accepted, and https-to-http redirects are followed. The post-download verify-build step runs after the addon has already loaded, so it is not an integrity gate. Version 1.7.0 (2026-07-08) adds SHA-256 checking, but only for the default github.com source and only when the consuming package publishes an artifactHashes map in its own package.json; configured mirrors and packages without that map still trust the download, so the mirror and downgrade paths remain open. The advisory describes a non-malicious proof of concept in which plaintext attacker bytes are written verbatim with exit 0. The npm package had 22.7M downloads in the 30 days to 2026-11-17. The one downstream I could verify is uhop/node-re2: releases 1.24.1 to 1.25.2 depend on ^1.6.0 and earlier releases on ^1.3.5 to ^1.4.0, and a fresh resolution of any of those ranges now picks 1.8.1. Exposure is therefore mainly lockfiles that still pin 1.6.0 or earlier. No in-the-wild exploitation is reported and the CVE is not in CISA KEV.
What to do
- Upgrade install-artifact-from-github to 1.7.0 or later wherever it appears in dependency trees, and check lockfiles for 1.6.0 or earlier, since a lockfile keeps the old version until it is refreshed
- 1.7.0 does not cover configured mirrors or packages without an artifactHashes map: unset RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR and similar variables in CI and shells, and never point them at hosts you do not control
- Build native addons from source where the artifact cannot be verified (1.7.0 adds --force-build and DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD), or use checksum-verified prebuild tooling
- Monitor for unexpected writes to native addon paths (e.g. build/Release/*.node) and verify hashes of deployed binaries
Fixed versions
- install-artifact-from-github 1.7.0 (SHA-256 check only for the default github.com source when the consuming package ships artifactHashes)
Sources
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