@fedfub npm worm: credential-stealing postinstall in @fedfub/utils and @fedfub/string-utils
Severity: critical · Patch status: no-fix-needed · Since 2026-11-20
Two npm packages published by the same author, @fedfub/utils 1.0.1 and @fedfub/string-utils 1.0.0, were confirmed malicious and removed from the registry. Their postinstall hooks run a self-propagating credential stealer (worm.js) that harvests secret-matching environment variables (KEY/SECRET/TOKEN/PASS/AWS/JWT/STRIPE/PAYPAL/DB/REDIS/MONGO), up to 5000 characters of every source file in the working directory, and ~/.ssh contents, exfiltrating them with host details to https://73.218.105.44:8080/collect. It then attempts to republish itself as <dependency-security-patch/-patch@99.0.0, injects itself into package.json files under the home directory, persists via @reboot crontab or Windows onlogon scheduled task, and polls /cmd every 30 seconds to execute arbitrary commands. Sandboxed installs confirmed C2 contact and persistence. No patched versions exist; anyone who installed either package is compromised.
What to do
- Assume compromise if either package was installed: rotate all secrets (cloud keys, database, Stripe/PayPal, JWT signing keys) and treat ~/.ssh keys as stolen
- Audit crontabs for @reboot entries and Windows Task Scheduler for onlogon tasks; remove persistence
- Search all package.json files (especially under the home directory) for injected fedfub-utils dependencies or -security-patch/-patch@99.0.0 packages and remove them
- Check npm logs and registry for unauthorized publishes of <name>-security-patch or <name>-patch packages under your dependency names
- Block outbound traffic to 73.218.105.44:8080 and hunt for /collect, /cmd and /result connections in logs
- Pin dependencies, use lockfiles, and avoid postinstall scripts from untrusted publishers
Sources
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