EggStreme: suspected Chinese APT rebuilds toolkit with passive backdoor, still targets Philippine government
Severity: high · Patch status: no-fix-needed · Since 2026-11-18
Bitdefender reports that the suspected Chinese APT behind the EggStreme malware framework rebuilt its toolkit after the framework's first public report in September 2025, and it assesses with high confidence that the operation still targets Philippine government organizations, with multiple victims. The rebuilt builds replace gRPC with raw TCP inside mutual TLS, move the loader from RC4 to RC5-32 and then to two custom CBC variants (AES-256-CBC is used in some configuration and inner layers), and drop the keylogger from newer samples. A new passive agent opens a listening port on TCP 5060 and waits for the operator to connect in, instead of calling out. The command set now runs to IDs 21 to 88 and adds AD reconnaissance, proxying, .NET and PowerShell execution, and a reflective PE stager. Operators ran VBScript and batch files over SMB from C:\Users\Public, and the loaders sideload under system library names such as dbghelp.dll and dwmapi.dll. Bitdefender says the timing suggests its own disclosure triggered the changes, and that campaign-specific certificate authorities are suggested but not confirmed. No CVE or vendor patch is involved; the response is detection, hunting and hardening. Bitdefender names no actor and makes no new attribution claim.
What to do
- Alert on creation of a firewall rule named "Core Networking - SIP" and review hosts listening on TCP 5060
- Alert on WScript.exe or cmd.exe running scripts from C:\Users\Public\ (prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat)
- Hunt for processes that read Alarm00.wav, appmain.sdb, expmain.sdb, systemZones.res, Feeds.tmp or msinfo32.dll, and for the HKCU Run value "StandaloneUpdater"
- Capture process memory before remediating an affected host, since the payloads run from memory
- Search for and block the domains, IPs and the 2019 CA key identifier in the Bitdefender IOC CSV (github.com/bitdefender/malware-ioc, 2026_11-eggstreme-iocs.csv)
- Restrict SMB paths and lateral movement, since the operators staged scripts and payloads over SMB
- Apply the loader hashes and sideloaded DLL names from the IOC CSV to static and heuristic detection
Sources
All live incidents on Threat Watch