COLD RELIC (COLDRIVER/Star Blizzard): stolen cloud data and identities used to breach second US org
Severity: high · Patch status: no-fix-needed · Since 2026-11-17
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant describe COLD RELIC (formerly COLDRIVER and UNC4057; also Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear), a Russian state-sponsored group that the US Department of Justice has assessed operates within the FSB. In late 2025 the group took over the cloud productivity environment of a US organisation using stolen Super Admin credentials, a US residential proxy close to the victim, and an MFA push-fatigue attack. It registered a device not previously seen in the tenant, kept access through passkeys, backup codes and rogue MFA devices, downloaded the whole cloud drive by mass-sharing files to an attacker-run mailbox, exported staff lists and deleted Alert Center notices. In 2026 it used the stolen data, staff directory and identities to impersonate an employee of that organisation over an encrypted messaging app. It then compromised a Microsoft Entra ID account at a second US organisation, which uses Entra ID as its SSO provider for Google Workspace, with phishing links that redirected through compromised websites carrying victim-referencing URL parameters, and bulk-downloaded that user's cloud drive. GTIG has seen new phishing operations as recently as November 2026. No vendor patch applies. Defence is phishing-resistant MFA, monitoring and restricting passkey and device enrolment, revoking sessions and OAuth grants on remediation (password resets alone did not evict the group in one case), blocking residential-proxy logons to admin accounts, and DLP on cloud storage.
What to do
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys); replace push, SMS and voice second factors
- Monitor passkey registrations and new MFA-device enrolments, especially for administrators; require admin or out-of-band approval for new MFA devices
- On suspected account compromise, revoke all sessions, refresh tokens and OAuth grants and remove unauthorized passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices; a password reset alone is not enough
- Audit third-party OAuth grants in Google Workspace and Microsoft 365
- Restrict admin sign-ins from consumer ISPs, VPNs and residential-proxy ASNs, and enrich authentication logs with proxy and VPN reputation data
- Alert on MFA-fatigue patterns, backup-code logins, directory user-list downloads, Customer Takeout, bulk or externally shared Drive activity, and deletion of Alert Center alerts
- Deploy cloud-storage DLP that alerts on passwords, rosters and .pst files and restricts mass external sharing
- Organisations and individuals may consider enrolling in Google's Advanced Protection Program
Sources
All live incidents on Threat Watch